Saturday, January 24, 2015

Sudairis Ascendant

With the accession of King Salman in Saudi Arabia, former Deputy Crown Prince Muqrin has been confirmed as moving up to crown prince.  King Salman has also appointed a new deputy crown prince, Muhammad b. Nayef.  Middle East Eye sees this as part of a generalized enhancement of the power of the Sudairi Seven princely lines:
"King Salman bin Abdulaziz al-Saud is now the ruler of Saudi Arabia, and has moved swiftly to appoint his son, 34-year-old Mohammed bin Salman, as Defence Minister and head of the Royal Court.

The newly-anointed monarch promoted Muqrin bin Abdulaziz to Crown Prince, now first in line to the throne, from being deputy, and appointed 55-year-old Interior Minister Mohammed bin Nayef as the second heir.

The new appointments herald a new era in Saudi monarchical politics, marked by the resurgence of the “Sudairi Seven,” a powerful alliance of sons of King Abdulaziz named after their mother Hassa bint Ahmad al-Sudairi.

The late Abdullah – whose mother was from the Shammar Bedouin tribe – was not one of the seven Sudairi brothers, and the first indications suggest that his men are being pushed out of power.

Abdullah’s son Mutaib – who is minister of the National Guard – has been overlooked to become deputy Crown Prince in favour of Mohammed bin Nayef.

His former head of the Royal Court, Khalid al-Tuwijri, has been replaced by the young Mohammed bin Salman.

This has been reported as having immediately undermined Abdullah’s legacy and affirmed the renewed power of the Sudairi alliance."
Muqrin's position of deputy crown prince existed at least in part as a safety net due to the poor health of the crown prince candidates.  There was no guarantee that it would continue into the new reign. That it has suggests that Muhammad b. Nayef really is the preferred heir, and Salman and his allies want to make sure want to make sure he is in line and can start accumulating the tools of informal power.

At the same time, however, Muqrin is crown prince, and not one of the Sudairi Seven.  As Salman's reign unfolds, we could see him removed as crown prince in favor of Muhammad.  Alternately, he could reign, but leave Muhammad in place as his own heir.  Muqrin being able to replace Muhammad as heir with one of his own sons seems less likely.  The longer Salman reigns, the more probable the first option becomes.
King Salman bin Abdulaziz al-Saud is now the ruler of Saudi Arabia, and has moved swiftly to appoint his son, 34-year-old Mohammed bin Salman, as Defence Minister and head of the Royal Court. - See more at:
King Salman bin Abdulaziz al-Saud is now the ruler of Saudi Arabia, and has moved swiftly to appoint his son, 34-year-old Mohammed bin Salman, as Defence Minister and head of the Royal Court. - See more at:
King Salman bin Abdulaziz al-Saud is now the ruler of Saudi Arabia, and has moved swiftly to appoint his son, 34-year-old Mohammed bin Salman, as Defence Minister and head of the Royal Court. - See more at:
King Salman bin Abdulaziz al-Saud is now the ruler of Saudi Arabia, and has moved swiftly to appoint his son, 34-year-old Mohammed bin Salman, as Defence Minister and head of the Royal Court. - See more at:


Thursday, January 22, 2015

Saudi Succession

Saudi Arabia's King Abdullah b. Abd al-Aziz has died, and his half-brother Salman is now the Crown Prince.  The Washington Post explains why the situation is touchy:
The monarch, believed to be 90, was succeeded by his brother, Crown Prince Salman, according to state television. That put the region’s most important Sunni power and America’s closest Arab ally in the hands of a 79-year-old who is reportedly in poor health and suffering from dementia...
While observers in Riyadh widely predicted a smooth transition to Salman, his poor health means his rule could be relatively short. Should there be a power struggle to succeed him, it could leave a vacuum in the Middle East at a critical time. Saudi Arabia is a key member of the U.S.-led coalition against the Islamic State and a major ally of the government that just fell in neighboring Yemen...
In an apparent bid to preempt quarrels about succession — and also secure the line for his own favored branch of the family — Abdullah last year took the unprecedented step of anointing a deputy heir, Prince Muqrin, 71, his youngest brother...
(In choosing Muqrin's successor) the Saudi royal family would face a far more complicated puzzle about who would succeed Muqrin, but it would almost certainly be a prince from the next generation, the grandchildren of Abdulaziz. Hundreds of princes belong to that generation.
One possibility for Salman is simply passing over him due to ill health and having Muqrin assume the throne right away.  There is precedent for this in the Gulf, as in 2006 Kuwait's Emir Sa'ad was removed on similar grounds after a reign of only nine days. In Saudi Arabia, however, there is experience of a king who reigns while another rules, as Abdullah himself held the reigns of power for an incapacitated King Fahd for years.

As far as the succession issue, as I've said before, the interests of dynastic preservation would lead towards establish some sort of principle of succession to limit the number of candidates beyond simply Abd al-Aziz b. Saud's grandsons.  The most obvious such principle would be to, in practice if not in theory, ensure that succession passes to a son of one of the Sudairi Seven, the sons Abd al-Aziz b. Saud had with Hassa bt. Ahmad, chief of the Sudairi clan in the early 20th century.  However, neither Abdullah nor Muqrin belongs to that faction, and it may not be possible for them to push forward against the influence of those two.  Promoting Sudairi Seven interests, of course, could be a reason to keep the Sudairi Salman on the throne.

In the introduction to her textbook on Chinese history called The Open Empire, Valerie Hansen describes a dynasty as a convenient fiction that legitimizes the rule of behind-the-scenes factions.  The Saudi dynasty is no one's fig leaf, but there are factions within the family itself, especially among those with no realistic chance at the throne or an important ministry themselves.  These negotiations are going on behind the scenes more intensely right now than they have for some time, for only Salman's fragile health stands between the House of Saud and the need to decisively move on the generational succession decision they have avoided for years.


American and Israeli Partisanship

American commentators have focused mostly on John Boehner's invitation to Benjamin Netanyahu to address a joint session of Congress as an attempt to counter the Obama administration's Iran policy, outsourcing the role of chief hawkish spokesperson to Israel's prime minister.  Israelis, however, see it in the context of Israel's election campaign:
From the Israeli point of view, there is no way to look at the extraordinary invitation House Speaker John Boehner extended to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to address both houses of Congress and not see an act of crass intervention in Israel’s electoral process...
The situation is so weird that it still remains to be seen whether Israel’s elections overseer will permit local TV stations to broadcast the speech live, as it falls pretty clearly into the rubric of free and unaccounted for campaign publicity. And another question? What will Barack Obama do with this unwanted visitor in town? Ignore him? Find an event in LA?
It’ll be interesting to watch Yitzhak Herzog in the coming days. For now, he has maintained  a civil, polite attitude towards Netanayhu, and, it goes without saying, towards all American officialdom. But John Boehner’s act goes way beyond the normal purview of a party leader in a friendly country. Its an act of hostile defiance aimed very personally at the man who could– yes, he might– be Israel’s next prime minister and its an act of overt partisanship at what Boehner must have known is an incredibly delicate moment. It really is an outrage, and its a test of Herzog’s new leadership persona.
One can view this as a significant  step towards a U.S.-Israel relationship in which political parties in one country are closely allied with a counterpart in the other.  Netanyahu began this, making known his preference for Republicans in Washington and all but openly campaigning for Romney in 2012.  The Israeli ambassador to the U.S. whom he appointed, Ron Derner, is both his own chief political guru and a man who has worked for Republican campaigns.  Sheldon Adelson also stands out as a significant funding source for both the Likud Party in Israel and the GOP.

Does this mean that if Herzog become prime minister, he will openly side with Democrats in U.S. political disputes?  The United States, of course, has done this sort of thing before.  The first President Bush was quite open about hurting Yitzhak Shamir in the campaign in which he fell from power.  However, the relationship has generally been between two nation-states independent of each other's internal politics.  This move by Boehner, coming on the heels of Netanyahu's 2012 involvement, threatens to create a new paradigm of Republicans allying with Likud against the Democrats and Labor.

If that happens, of course, it could finally weaken the politically articulated idea that the U.S. has to support whatever an Israeli government does.

Labels: ,

Thursday, January 15, 2015

Saudi Arabia-Iraq Barrier

A number of years ago, Saudi Arabia built a border fence with Yemen in an attempt to keep out migrant workers from that country.  Now they are building one on their border with Iraq to defend against ISIS infiltration:
Saudi Arabia has been constructing a 600-mile East-West barrier on its Northern Border with Iraq since September.
The main function of the barrier will be keeping out ISIS militants, who have stated that among their goals is an eventual takeover of the Muslim holy cities of Mecca and Medina, both of which lie deep inside Saudi territory, according to United Press International.
This past week, a commander and two guards on the Saudi-Iraq border were killed during an attack by Islamic State militants, the first direct ground assault by the group on the border...
The Saudi "Great Wall" as it's being dubbed by some media outlets, will be a fence and ditch barrier that features soft sand embankments that is designed to slow down infiltrators on foot and are too step to drive a tired-vehicle up, according to the Telegraph of London. It will have 40 watchtowers and seven command and control centers complete with radar that can detect aircraft and vehicles as far away as 22 miles as well as day and night camera installations. 
The barrier system will have five layers of fencing, complete with razor wire and underground motion sensors that trigger a silent alarm. The 600-mile structure will be patrolled by border guards and 240 rapid response vehicles. The Saudis sent 30,000 soldiers to patrol the border in July 2014 after ISIS forces swept into western Iraq and Iraqi guards on the Saudi border fled.

Labels: ,

Tuesday, January 13, 2015

Modern Middle Eastern History Syllabus

Here, sans bureaucratic sections, is my Spring 2015 syllabus for "History of the Modern Middle East."

HIS 344: The Modern Middle East
208 Dauphin Humanities Center, MWF 9:00 a.m.
Dr. Brian J. Ulrich

Office: 201 Dauphin Humanities Center, ex. 1736
Office Hours: 11 – 11:50 a.m. MWF, 2-4:00 p.m. W

Required Texts:

The Middle East in Modern World History, Ernest Tucker
The Modern Middle East and North Africa: A History in Documents, Julia Clancy-Smith and Charles Smith
The Israel-Palestine Conflict: Contested Histories, Neil Caplan
For Better, For Worse: The Marriage Crisis that Made Modern Egypt, Hanan Kholoussy

Course Overview:

This course will cover the history of the Middle East from the 18th century to the present.  It is divided into two sections.  The first half will deal with the region during a long 19th century characterized by rapid transformations analogous to those found elsewhere in the world with the shift from an agrarian to an industrial social and economic order.  In particular, we will emphasize the rising significance of Europe for the Middle East, the forms of colonialism found in the Middle East and North Africa, developments within Middle Eastern society and culture, and the articulation of new political concepts and ideologies which have continuing importance in the region.  At the end of this section of the course, students will have an appreciation for events and developments which loom large in the Middle Eastern historical memory, an understanding of key concepts, an appreciation for the ways in which aspects of the region often described as “traditional” or even “medieval” are in fact part of the modern world, and a sound basis for comparing Middle Eastern developments in this period with those in other regions.

The second half of the course will focus on the important developments in the region during the 20th century, including but not limited to those conflicts which frequently make the headlines in American media.  Important subthemes include the role of foreign powers in the region’s politics and the continuing transformation of society and culture within the Middle East.  In furtherance of Shippensburg’s integrated history curriculum, we will also highlight the ways in which different constructed historical narratives figure into the region’s conflicts, with a special focus on the Arab-Israeli conflict.  At the end of this section of the course, students will be conversant with Arab, Iranian and Turkish nationalism, the Arab-Israeli conflict, political Islam, and the political economy of the region.


Quizzes and Paragraphs: 10%
Participation: 10%
Photo Interpretation Essay: 10%
Hanan Kholoussy Essay: 12.5%
Research Paper: 15%
Midterm Exam: 20%
Final Exam: 22.5%

Schedule of Readings and Major Assignments

January 21 – Course Intro
January 23 – Tucker, 17-25 (Islam and Middle Eastern history)

January 26 – Tucker, 41-5; Sam White, The Climate of Rebellion in the Early Modern Ottoman Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp.137-9, 174-9, 222-5, 247-8, 275, 291-7. (For this books’ pages in EBL navigation bar at top, add 24) (Ottoman Decline)
January 28 – Dina Rizk Khoury, “The Ottoman centre versus provincial power-holders: an analysis of the historiography,” The Cambridge History of Turkey, Vol. III, ed. Suriya N. Faroqhi (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 135-56. (18th century Ottoman Empire)
January 30 – Tucker, 54-67 (Selim III – Auspicious Incident)

February 2 – Clancy-Smith and Smith, 65-70; Judith Tucker, “Decline of the Family Economy in Mid-Nineteenth Century Egypt,” Arab Studies Quarterly 1 (1979): 245-71 (Mehmet Ali)
February 4 – Tucker, 71-86; Clancy-Smith and Smith, 70-4 (Tanzimat Era)
February 6 – Clancy-Smith and Clancy, pp. 44-8; Haim Gerber, “The Ottoman Land Law of 1858 and Its Consequences,” The Social Origins of the Modern Middle East (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner: 1987), 67-90. (Tanzimat Era)

February 9 – Tucker, 104-7; Kemal Karpat, “The New Middle Classes and the Naksbandia,” The Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith, and Community in the Late Ottoman State (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 89-116 (Islamic reformism)
February 11 – Clancy-Smith and Smith, 57-9, 76-7; Laurence Louer, “The Formation of a Central Religious Authority,” Transnational Shia Politics: Religious and Political Networks in the Gulf (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), pp. 69-82. (Shi’ism)
February 13 – Tucker, 91-5; Clancy-Smith and Smith, 29-43 (colonialism)

February 16 – Ehud Toledano, “Social and economic change in the ‘long nineteenth century,’” Cambridge History of Egypt, Vol. II, ed. M.W. Daly (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 252-84. (Late 19th century Egypt)
February 18 – Tucker, 99-104; Kemal Karpat, The Politicization of Islam, pp. 145-54, 185-8 AbdulHamid II)
February 20 – Tucker, 67-9, 87-9, 95-6 (19th-century Iran)

February 23 – Tucker, 107-9, 112-24; Clancy-Smith and Smith, 77-84 (Constitutions) (Photo Interpretation Essay Due)
February 25 – Tucker, 128-43; Clancy-Smith and Smith, 109-13; 60 Minutes on Armenian Genocide (World War I and Armenian Genocide)
February 27 – Exam ID Section

March 2 – Exam Essay Section
March 4 – Tucker, 162-6, 243-9, 364-5; Clancy-Smith and Smith, 157-61 (Modern Turkey)
March 6 - Ervand Abrahamian, “The Iron First of Reza Shah,” A History of Modern Iran (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 63-96. (Reza Shah)


March 16 – Tucker, 144-59; Clancy-Smith and Smith, 113-8, 120-30, 134-5 (New Order)
March 18 – Caplan, 1-55 (Arab-Israeli Conflict intro)
March 20 – Tucker, 175-8; Kholoussy, 1-22; Clancy-Smith and Smith, 166-8, 170-3 (Arab world interwar period: Egypt)

March 23 – Tucker, 184-8; Kholoussy, 23-75 (Arab world interwar period: Syria and Lebanon)
March 25 – Tucker, 181-4; Kholoussy, 77-127 (Arab world interwar period: Iraq and Jordan) (Hanan Kholoussy Essay due)
March 27 – Caplan, 56-100 (Mandatory Palestine)

March 30 – Tucker, 190-200; Clancy-Smith and Smith, 194-7; Orit Bashkin, New Babylonians: A History of Jews in Modern Iraq (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012), pp. 112-25 (World War II)
April 1 – Tucker, 202-11; Caplan, 101-30; Clancy-Smith and Smith, 207-9 (1948)
April 3 – Tucker, 213-29; Caplan, 131-43; Clancy-Smith and Smith, 211-2 (Pan-Arabism)

April 6 – Albert Hourani, “The Algerian War,” A History of the Arab Peoples, (Cambridge: Belknap, 1991), pp. 369-72; Clancy-Smith and Smith, 216-24 (Post-French North Africa)
April 8 – Tucker, 249-56; Ervand Abrahamian, The Coup: 1953, the CIA, and the Roots of Modern U.S.-Iranian Relations (New York: New Press, 2013), pp. 205-26 (Mossadeq and Muhammad Reza Pahlavi)
April 10 – Tucker, 231-41; Caplan, 143-77 (1967 and after)

April 13 – Tucker, 258-70, 282-5; OPEC reading TBA (oil and 1973)
April 15 – James Gelvin, The Modern Middle East: A History, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 290-9; Clancy-Smith and Smith, 233-5; Barbara Zollner, The Muslim Brotherhood: Hasan al-Hudaybi and Ideology (New York: Routledge, 2009), pp. 106-29  (Infitah and Islamism)
April 17 – Tucker, 272-82, 309-15; Caplan, 178-94 (Camp David and Lebanon)

April 20 – Tucker, 287-303, 323-7 (“Long” 1980’s)
April 22 – Tucker, 327-35, 350-5; Caplan, 195-210 (Intifada and Peace Process)
April 24 – Caplan, pp. 221-67 (Philosophical Discussion)

April 27 – Michael Axworthy, “Iran Since the Revolution: Islamic Revival, War and Confrontation,” A History of Iran: Empire of the Mind (New York: Basic Books, 2008), pp. 259-81. (Research Paper Due)
April 29 – Tucker, 337-41, 346-50; Nir Rosen, Aftermath: Following the Bloodshed of America’s Wars in the Muslim World (New York: Nation Books, 2010), pp. TBA (Post-9/11 Wars)
May 1 – Clancy-Smith and Smith, 292-8; Reflections on the Arab Uprisings, essays by Vickie Langohr, Quinn Mecham, David Siddhartha Patel, Curtis Ryan, and Mark Tessler (Arab Spring and Aftermath)

Labels: ,

Thursday, December 18, 2014

Refounding Madaba (Repost)

The Jordanian city of Madaba touts an old heritage, but the modern city only dates back to 1881 when it was settled by Christians from Karak. During this period, lots of new land was being brought under cultivation throughout the Middle East and settlement was increasing. The story of Madaba, however, is a bit wilder than most, as found in Eugene Rogan's Frontiers of the State in the Late Ottoman Empire: Transjordan, 1850-1921.

In November 1879, a young Roman Catholic woman was kidnapped by a Muslim male of the Sarayra family, and her relatives demanded her return. The Majalis, the leading Muslim notable family in the region, sided with the Catholics, and the woman was released to the Majalis, who in turn handed her over to local Catholic clergy.

Unfortunately for the Catholic clergy, simply returning her to her family proved not to be an option, as the people of Karak insisted she be killed to redeem the family's honor, in what is now known as an "honor killing." The priests, therefore, Fr. Alexandro Macagno and Fr. Paolo Bandoli, smuggled her to Jerusalem and on to Nablus. Her brother, frustrated in his determination to murder her, turned instead on the Sarayra, and killed a number of them at Wadi Hasa near the city.

This, in turn, led to tribal tensions between the Sarayra and the Roman Catholic tribe of 'Uzayzat, and the Catholic clergy decided the best thing to do would be to simply have their flock leave the area. Accompanied by three 'Uzayzat shaykhs, Fr. Bandoli surveyed central Jordan, and together they decided Madaba was the best place to settle.

The determination to let the Christians have Madaba was made by none other than Midhat Pasha, a reformist statesman who turns up all over the mid-19th century Ottoman Empire, and at this time was governor of Damascus. The settlement was opposed by Sattam Fayiz of the Bani Sakhr tribe, which claimed Madaba as part of their domain and didn't want to lose it, while potentially forming an alliance with the Majalis of Karak. Midhat Pasha, however, ruled against the Bani Sakhr as part of his overarching program to get the tribal authorities to submit to the Ottoman administration, in this case by registering land and paying taxes on it. They hadn't done that, so in the eyes of the state the land was vacant and the 'Uzayzat could claim it.

One other side note is that Fr. Bandoli, who led the migration from Karak to resettle Madaba, was himself and interesting figure who tried to take on the role of Bedouin shaykh in Madaba and ultimately ended his life as a book peddler for the Protestant Bible Society in Alexandria, Egypt.

Labels: ,

Thursday, December 04, 2014

Fortress of the Raven (Repost)

(Photo from Flickr user frankenschulz under a Creative Commons license)

Despite having spent a lot of time in Jordan, I've never been to Karak, the name of a town near the Dead Sea and its imposing castle which may be the kingdom's most visited Crusader site. Begun around 1142 by Pagan the Butler under the aegis of the Kingdom of Jerusalem, it may be most famous in the West as a seat of Reynald of Chatillon, whose reputation for provocation was illustrated in the 2005 film Kingdom of Heaven. Reynald's actions wrecked the truce which existed between Saladin and Baldwin IV (the Leper King), leading not only Jerusalem, but Karak to fall to Saladin and the Ayyubid dynasty he founded.

Last year saw the publication of The Fortress of the Raven, a typically expensive Brill title by Marcus Milwright, who has also written a historical account for the Virtual Karak Resources Project. The book combines evidence from both material and written sources to reconstruct the political and economic history of the Karak area in ways that highlight the relationship between them. His concluding paragraph begins, "Karak may be regarded as a market town whose history was transformed by the construction of a major castle at its southern extremity." The area did produce an agricultural surplus and benefited from traffic along the Kingshighway, but the construction of the fortress led to its becoming an administrative center with rulers and bureaucrats importing luxuries, primarily from Palestine, making it a more important trading stop than it would otherwise have been.

The castle's strategic importance is best illustrated by an account Milwright describes on pp. 38-9 of his book, in which following the capture of the Egyptian port Damietta by the Fifth Crusade, the status of Karak and the outpost of Shawbak further south were the chief sticking point in negotiations, as the Crusaders felt they could not permit Ayyubid bases so close to a reconstituted Kingdom of Jerusalem, nor were the Ayyubids willing to risk a possible division of Syria and Egypt through an undefended Jordan. A later Ayyubid ruler would advise his son to hand over both Shawbak and the coast of Syria before relinquishing Karak.

The age of Egypt's Mamluk rulers, however, which began in 1250, would make evident another reason for Karak's strategic importance. Sultan Baybars stayed in the castle regularly in order to maintain a relationship with the Bedouin of the area, who provided intelligence, livestock, and military services. Later, after the 1293 assassination of Sultan al-Ashraf Khalil, who had driven the Crusaders from their last outpost in Acre, the leaders of rival factions installed the 9-year-old an-Nasir Muhammad as a puppet, though after a shift in their schemes several months later he was sent into exile in Karak, an area he came to know well. In 1299 he was recalled again to serve as puppet, but after ten years taken up mainly with wars against the Mongols, he sought to escape the powers behind the throne and went back to Karak, where he tried to win allies among the area's magnates and Bedouin. After about a year he returned to Cairo with their support and began a 32-year reign which is usually considered the apogee of Mamluk power.

For whatever reason, the later Mamluks paid less attention to the area, and shortly after the Ottomans conquered the region in the early 1500's, they began ruling through the local Bedouin leaders while developing a new transportation route and fortresses further east, probably close to the Desert Highway of today.

Labels: , ,

Monday, November 24, 2014

"National Rights" in Israel

Israel is poised to take a huge step down the path of right-wing nationalism:
A controversial bill that officially defines Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish people has been approved by cabinet despite warnings that the move risks undermining the country’s democratic character...
The bill, which is intended to become part of Israel’s basic laws, would recognise Israel’s Jewish character, institutionalise Jewish law as an inspiration for legislation and delist Arabic as a second official language...
The bill, which still requires the Knesset’s approval to become a law, comes as tensions between Israelis and Palestinians rise sharply, and friction within Israel’s Arab minority grows...
According to many critics, the new wording would weaken the wording of Israel’s declaration of independence, which states that the new state would “be based on the principles of liberty, justice and freedom expressed by the prophets of Israel [and] affirm complete social and political equality for all its citizens, regardless of religion, race or gender”.
Some of this is symbolic.  No one is going to pass Knesset bills implementing halakha outside of those areas of family law already governed by the rabbinate.  The "national rights" spelled out are also mostly items, such as the national anthem, that are already in place.  What concerns me is the value statement of this bill, which seems to state clearly that equality for all citizens is no longer something worth giving even lip service to.  That is a dangerous road.


Tuesday, November 18, 2014

Housekeeping Note

I have not posted in a while, and expect rare posting to be the norm through the end of this year.  I have a book manuscript due in about six weeks, and am simply locked in on that.  In addition, I am buying my first home and learning all the complexities of real estate transactions.

What I will probably do to keep a bit of action around here is dig into my archives for old history posts I can re-post.  In the meantime, I am still active on Twitter at @brianjulrich, so feel free to follow me there!


Saturday, November 01, 2014

Jerusalem Intifada?

Ahmad Melhem wonders if the current Palestinian protests in Jerusalem could become something more significant:
Jerusalem-based youth activist Mesbah Abu Sabih told Al-Monitor that the intensity and points of engagement of the clashes vary from time to time; they reached their peak following the death of Abu Khdeir and recur following each new martyr in the city.
He recognized that the confrontations are periodical as they depend on the developments in the city, but that there are places where confrontations occur often, such as in the neighborhoods of Issawiya and Silwan, and the Saadia, Bab Hutta, Ras al-Amud and Tur neighborhoods in the Old City.
Abu Diab said that this uprising is led by youths aged 14-to-20 who use all means to resist the occupation. They are aware of the threats facing both their city and their future, and they know full well the nature of the conflict with the Israelis...
Abu Sabih said that no one is supporting or leading the street protests. This is why they are ongoing in some areas and intermittent in others. “There is no leadership managing things on the ground. The lack of leadership is the cause behind the irregularity of the protests, which have become linked to events alone."
There is definitely a broad spirit of activism among Palestinians right now, one seen also in the civil disobedience campaign led by Abu Rahma and the West Bank protests in solidarity with Gaza during last summer's war.  This mood is not orchestrated by Fatah or Hamas, both of whom are judged failures by the Palestinian street.  In Jerusalem, the clashes and protests are in the hands of Palestinians who were toddlers during the al-Aqsa Intifada and have no memory of a functioning peace process.  I don't have the information to comment on whether matters will escalate or dissipate, but the lay of the Palestinian activist land bears watching.


Sunday, October 19, 2014

Israel and Palestinian Unity

Shlomi Eldar notices that Israel appears to have accepted the Palestinian unity government:
Last week, on Oct. 9, the Palestinian unity government held its first meeting in the Gaza Strip since the 2007 overthrow. For the government to convene, Israel was required to allow the Palestinian ministers who reside in the West Bank to pass through its territory on their way from Ramallah to Gaza. Officials of the Israeli administration for Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT) prepared the Erez crossing for the passage of Palestinian Prime Minister Rami Hamdallah and his Cabinet ministers, who were quick to pose for a photo op embracing Hamas Gaza leader Ismail Haniyeh, who came to greet and congratulate them.
It was not simply a procedural matter of granting permits; it was a clear Israeli diplomatic move: to allow the Palestinian unity government to convene in Gaza under the auspices of the Hamas leaders in the Gaza Strip — the ones whom Israel viewed as legitimate assassination targets less than two months ago.
In fact, the whole process of Gaza’s reconstruction following Operation Protective Edge is taking shape by virtue of the unity government, which Israel pilloried as a partner in Hamas terrorism until very recently.

Labels: ,

Thursday, October 09, 2014

Urwa's Muhammad, Part III

This is the last post in my series on a current model of historical Muhammad research.  I putting links to all of them at the bottom of the first.

7.) Conquest of Mecca - Urwa b. al-Zubayr was clearly not a preferred authority for military campaigns.  All the authors are willing to say for sure about Urwa's transmission on this matter is that there was a connection between Hudaybiyya and the conquest of Mecca, that after the conquest of Mecca Muhammad spent two weeks in the city before attack the Hawazin, and that the Hawazin prisoners were freed when their people accepted Islam.

When it comes to his son Hisham b. Urwa, however, the authors believe that he reported the following:  Mecca violated the treaty, leading to the Muslim conquest of the city.  Abu Sufyan and two other Meccans went to Muhammad before the conquest and converted to Islam.  Muhammad then sent them back to the city to preach Islam.  He also said that anyone who took refuge in the homes of Abu Sufyan and another of the new Meccan converts would have their safety guaranteed when the Muslims attacked.  For the attack, Muhammad and his general Khalid b. al-Walid approached from different sides.  Only two people were killed in the fighting, then afterward we have the Hawazin matter as described above.

This account does not include the iconic scene for Muslims I have known, the "Cleansing of the Ka'aba" followed by the pardoning of the Meccans.  According to this story, when he enters the city, Muhammad goes to the Ka'aba and smashes its idols, leaving only an icon of Jesus and the Virgin Mary, presumably because Jesus is a prophet in Islam.  While he is doing this, the Meccans come out of where they had taken sanctuary (some sources claim all houses in Mecca were sanctuaries, and not just Abu Sufyan's).  Muhammad then comes out to address them, saying brief words that God is one and polytheism wrong, God has shown his faithfulness to his servants by helping them triumph over their enemies, Meccan pride in their heritage and tribal ancestry is wrong because all are descendants of Adam, and finishing with Quran 49:13.

In this story, Muhammad then asks the Meccans what he expects him to do to them.  (By Arabian tradition, prisoners of war could be enslaved, held for ransom, or on very rare occasions killed.)  The Meccans reply that they expect mercy, because they have seen nothing but that from him.  Muhammad then says that he will treat them as Joseph treated his brothers who sold him into slavery, and declares a general amnesty.  The Meccans then convert to Islam en masse, with the implication that they are moved by Muhammad's character and the powerlessness of their gods before his.

This is mentioned nowhere in the Urwa corpus, nor is it mentioned in Ibn Rashid.  Both the Tabari and Ibn Hisham recensions of Ibn Ishaq have it, but the chain of authorities goes back only two generations to the early 700's.  My own impression is that it comes from the story-telling tradition, a pious account designed to telescope developments to convey an essential truth.  In addition to its rather cinematic staging, we have a crowd speaking Greek chorus-style.  This is something we also often see in the Christian gospels.

The accounts presented above both leave open whether Muhammad forced conversions of Meccan polytheists.  A standard interpretation of sura 9, linked to this period of his life, says he did, but I think there are good reasons for doubting this.  First, short Muslim accounts do reference various people whom Muhammad allegedly ordered killed after the conquest.  These, however, are hard to work with, and contradictory both with each other and accounts which have allegedly killed people alive later.  More to the point, the "smoke" behind which a fire may lie is that Muhammad was most concerned with avoiding any violence that would violate Mecca's sacred status, including violence against polytheists.  (UPDATE:  In the account of the Hawazin, the prisoners were freed when others from their tribe accepted Islam.)  Looking more broadly, there is archaeological evidence suggesting that pagan practices survived in Arabia into the 700's.  For my book project, I've been looking into the early 700's conquest of the Indus Valley, and the followers of Indian religions there were treated no differently than Christians and Jews elsewhere.  There were still pagans in the Middle Eastern city of Harran in the 830's, when we know the Abbasid caliph al-Ma'mun wanted to force their conversion until he got talked out of it.

Pre-Islamic Western Arabia had several cities sacred to certain gods; within the precincts of these cities, violence was not permitted, and the peace was guaranteed by the military reputation of the lineage which dominated the city and oversaw the performance of the rituals of the god.  Muhammad seems to have established Medina as such a city for the "God of Abraham."  If he did, then conflict with Mecca was probably inevitable, regardless of who started it.  In Mecca, the policy can be read as control of the city's ritual space rather than a concern with individual beliefs.  A command to "establish prayer" in this cultural context is different from a command for everyone to pray.  (I think something like this is an argument of Aziz al-Azmeh's recent The Emergence of Islam in Late Antiquity, though I need to read and digest that book carefully sometime in 2015.)

Three Final Thoughts

First, a brief personal note.  Historical Muhammad research is its own distinct subspecialty within early Islamic history, and it is not my own subspecialty.  This is not just a case of academic hyper-specialization.  The potential source material is huge.  For example, Sunnis recognize about 10,000 authentic hadith.  For modern historical methods, we would need to look also at those deemed inauthentic, Shi'ite hadith, material found only in historians and Quran commentaries and other scattered references.  I have referred occasionally to the two 8th-century biographies if Ibn Ishaq and Ibn Rashid, but have made no pretense of looking at later bios which certainly preserve older material.  This is interesting and important research which I felt deserved a wider audience, and I come at it as someone who understands the issues involved, but not as someone who can pronounce on individual points in detail.

Second, it is a grave error to look at secular scholarly reconstructions of Muhammad, even those by scholars of Muslim heritage, and on that basis claim to understand Islam.  This is the same with any religion - in Western Christianity, reading Bart Ehrman and John Dominic Crossan will not lead you to understand what Christians mean when they recite the Nicene Creed or declare they just accepted Jesus as their personal Saviour.  The only way to research what Muhammad means to Muslims is to look at Muslim religious sources.  In the United States, my sense is that Muslims generally learn about the life of Muhammad through abridged translations of Ibn Ishaq and, particularly for younger Muslims, the interpretation of his life by Tariq Ramadan.  And yes, for the Muhammad of, say, the Taliban, you would want to look at a completely different set of sources.

I am, at any rate, not even sure what the historical reconstruction described here would mean theologically.  How does a desire for Islam to occupy the sacred centers of Western Arabia's stateless society translate into today?  An understanding of the Islamization of Arabia and the first wave of Islamic conquests under Umar might have a bearing on this, but none has been undertaken since 1981.  The distinction which arose in the late 700's of a division between a "House of Islam" and a "House of War" does seem a logical reading of the situation, but even then, many would say that the "House of Islam" should be any land where Islam can be practiced, not necessarily a land ruled by Muslims.  This is not just a modern interpretation; it first caught on in the 12th century among Muslims living in the Qara Khitai Khanate.

Third, I am aware that for many Muslims, there is something offensive about non-Muslims, particularly of Western Christian background, studying the history of the Islamic world and especially Islamic sacred history.  The last 200-300 years have seen a pattern of military, economic, and cultural assaults on Muslim-majority societies all over the world, and some take the more general stand that each civilization should study and teach its own history.  However, I admit despite understanding where this critique comes from, I do not find it persuasive.

Civilizations are not sealed compartments that can convey authenticity.  For example, today Christians arguing against atheism often reference the "Kalam Cosmological Argument" for the existence of God, an argument which draws upon Muslim thought.  Study the history of this idea advanced by Christians, therefore, whether to support or refute it, therefore involves the study of the milieu of Muslim thought.  Beyond that, Muhammad and his community did not just impact what became Islam.  If we define "Western" as the culture that developed out of medieval Christendom, then its geographical scope would be different were it not for Islam.  Finally, comparative history matters, and by definition cannot be limited to a single cultural background.

Although the book I have blogged about was written by scholars in Switzerland, I do not see it as purely a product of "Western civilization."  Most obviously, they build upon the work of isnads from the medieval Muslims.  Beyond that, I understand their methods are similar to those advanced by some Muslim scholars in Muslim-majority societies during the 20th century.  I wish I knew more about that so I could credit those Muslim scholars, but I do not.  I do, however, perhaps naively, believe that we can have a global community of scholars who are all collectively dedicated to understanding the human past.

Labels: , ,

Saturday, October 04, 2014

Azerbaijan's Drone Build-Up

Flush with Caspian Sea natural gas wealth, Azerbaijan has for a number of years been building up its military capacity, especially vis-a-vis rival Armenia.  Here is the latest:
Heightened tensions with longtime foe Armenia over breakaway Nagorno Karabakh and mediator Russia’s Ukrainian adventure appear to be pushing Caspian-Sea energy power Azerbaijan ever more strongly toward a military strategy of self-reliance.
The strategy comes via two approaches: first, a build-up in Azerbaijani-made military equipment, including drones co-produced with Israel; and, second, a new defense troika with longtime strategic partners Turkey, a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, and neighbouring Georgia, a NATO-member-hopeful.
Nor is this a strategy just left to paper. On Sep. 11, Azerbaijani Defense Minister Yaver Jamalov announced to reporters that Azerbaijan plans to export 100 drones, co-produced at a local Azerbaijani-Israeli plant, to “one of the NATO countries.” The remarks headlined the country’s first international defense-industry show, ADEX-2014, held on Sep. 11-13 in the Azerbaijani capital, Baku.
Some of the background here is Russian support for Armenia in the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh.  Based on what happened in Ukraine, Azerbaijan fears that Russia could similarly attempt to formally impose a pro-Armenian settlement there.

(Oh, and yes, my last "historical Muhammad" post is still coming.)

Labels: , ,

Thursday, October 02, 2014

Urwa's Muhammad, Part II

This is the second of what will actually be three posts on the research of Andreas Goerke and Gregor Schoeler into Urwa b. al-Zubayr's information about Muhammad.  I explained the issues here and posted the first part here.  The third post will come tomorrow or over the weekend.  I am organizing it by the seven major episodes of Muhammad's life concerning which Goerke and Schoeler found that Urwa taught substantial narratives.

4.) Slander Against Aisha - According to the authors, Urwa's material on this is better than any other issue, perhaps because his main source was Aisha, who obviously had a special interest in it.  The authors conclude that Urwa passed on that rumors began circulating in Medina that Aisha had committed adultery, which Aisha learned about from a woman named Umm Mistah.  Aisha then asked Muhammad if she can return to her parents' house, which he accepted.  On the advice of a Companion or two, Muhammad asked Aisha's servant girl if he knows of any bad doings by Aisha, and the girl spoke only praise of her.  Muhammad then spoke of the matter before the assembly of Medina, leading to a stand-off between Aws and Khazraj, the two dominant tribes, with Sa'd b. Mu'adh, the leader of Aws, offering to kill the Khazraj leader Abdullah b. Ubayy for spreading the rumors.  The Khazraj objected to this plan, and Muhammad calmed the assembly.  Muhammad then went to Aisha, asking if the rumors were true, and offering forgiveness if they were.  Finally, Sura 24 was revealed, leading to the exoneration of Aisha and punishment of the leading rumor-mongers.

The standard version includes the idea that prior to this, Aisha had accompanied Muhammad on a raid, and was inadvertently left behind when she went to look for a missing necklace.  After a day or so in the desert, a man found her and escorted her to Medina; this was the man with whom she had the alleged affair.  Urwa may have passed on information about the man escorting her back after she was left behind on a raid, but there is no evidence he had a necklace story or a specific raid, and his inclusion of Sa'd b. Mu'adh puts it before its place in the standard biographies, by which time Sa'd is dead.  Another thing missing is the role of Ali b. Abi Talib, who in the standard accounts urged Muhammad to divorce Aisha.  The authors, however, note that at later stages of transmission, an anti-Aisha role of Ali was added by two different transmitters, presumably as Sunni propaganda.

According to the possible "connecting tissue" of the standard bios, Abdullah b. Ubayy was the dominant figure in Medina before Muhammad came, but was unable to end the tribal feuds, a critical role for Arabian leaders.  When Muhammad came and secured his position by ending them, Abdullah b. Ubayy converted to Islam, but often criticized his leadership and sought to undermine him.  Early Islamic exegetes said that he and his followers were the "Hypocrites" often referred to in the Qur'an.  The bios present him as often vexing Muhammad, but Muhammad always tolerated him, and when he died in 631, Muhammad even performed his funeral prayers.

How much of that is truly early tradition?  I have no idea, but it is what I have to offer to clarify the players.  The main point may be that even though in the later tradition this is famous partly as a source of enmity between Ali and Aisha that prefigures the Sunni/Shi'ite division, Urwa's information on it places it squarely within the reputational politics of Muhammad's Medina.

5.) Death of Sa'd b. Mu'adh - I'd guess most Muslims have never heard of Sa'd b. Mu'adh, who led the Aws, one of the two most powerful tribes in Medina.  He seems to have mattered to Urwa, though.  This, however, is the weakest of the seven account as far as the authors' efforts to find authentic information Urwa transmitted.  In fact, applying their methods, they can only say for sure that Urwa's son and student Hisham b. Urwa transmitted on this, though they say they do believe he got his information from Urwa himself.  If I'm reading them correctly, then even from Hisham they have only two points meeting their criteria for certainty: 1.) When Sa'd was lying wounded in the mosque, Muhammad erected a tent over him for visitors and 2.) When the B. Qurayza surrendered to Muhammad, he chose to defer judgment over them to Sa'd, as they Qurayza were confederates of the Aws.  Sa'd was brought with his wound, and declared that their men should be slain, the women and children sold into slavery, and their property confiscated.  Muhammad then had this done.

We need a broader view here.  A potential fuller account from Hisham b. Urwa, though again with far less certainty, is that Sa'd was wounded at the Battle of the Trench, then taken to the mosque and Muhammad erected the tent.  Then the Archangel Gabriel appeared to warn Muhammad that the B. Qurayza were fighting the Muslims.  Muhammad and the Muslims won, then Sa'd gave his judgment, then he died of his wound, possibly after lying in the mosque awhile a bleeding profusely.  (Notice this includes the only truly supernatural event we've encountered.)

The Battle of the Trench was a month-long siege of Medina by a Mecca-led alliance.  It is named for a trench which Muslims dug around the exposed north of the city where most of the fighting happened.  Other sides of the city had natural defenses or were protected by tribal allies.  The B. Qurayza were a Jewish tribe allied with the Muslims.  Before their unsuccessful final attempt to take Medina, the Meccans "flipped" them so they would launch a surprise attack from behind Muslim lines.  The massacre is obviously brutal, and some modern Muslims have denied it happened; I doubt what's above will change many minds.  We should probably see it as a parallel to the reported massacres of Benjamin and Amalek in the deep past of the Hebrews, an unusual but not unheard of measure taken against enemies where all men were potential warriors and there was no ruling legal authority.

6.) Peace of Hudaybiyya - Urwa does not have chronology except by implication; however, the standard date for this event is 628, a the year following the Battle of the Trench.  Crucial background, of course, is that the Ka'aba was in Mecca, and this was a sacred house open to all.  That status was a source of Meccan power.  The Muslims believe it was built by Abraham and Ishmael as the first mosque, and something like this may have been more widely spread among the generically monotheistic hanif movement.

Anyway, what the authors conclude is definitely authentic Urwa material is that Muhammad decided to undertake a peaceful pilgrimage to the Ka'aba, and with several hundred Muslims entered into a state of ritual purity and advanced toward Mecca.  At a place called 'Usfan, he learned that the Meccans wanted to prevent him from arriving, and sent out cavalry to intercept, leading Muhammad to take a different route.  At a (pagan) sacred ground called Hudaybiyya, Muhammad's camel stopped and would go no farther.  Muhammad took this as a sign from God and so they all stopped there.  To get water, they poked a watering-hole with an arrow until they found water.  The Meccans sent messengers to Muhammad (because they could note fight in the sacred ground), and they began negotiating; the lead Meccan negotiator was Suhayl b. 'Amr.  They wound up drawing up a treaty to end the war; Muhammad made the concession that the divine invocations need not be specifically Muslim as long as they invoked a single anonymous "God."  Muhammad also agreed to send Muslim converts from Mecca back to their families upon request, and to permit anyone who no longer wished to be Muslim to return to Mecca, as well.  Abu Jandal fled to Muhammad, but was sent back by the terms of the treaty.

The "Muhammad of Hudaybiyya" is, of course, beloved to many Muslims who do not see their religion as encouraging violence.  They can take solace that in Gorke and Schoeler's opinion, Hudaybiya, the Aisha slander, and the flight to Medina are actually the three most solid elements of their proposed authentic Urwa corpus.  The other terms of the agreement, such as the 10-year duration and what happened to the intended pilgrimage, are not in all versions of the agreement.  The "Treaty of Hudaybiyya" of Islamic tradition, therefore, may be like the "Seven Last Words of Christ" in Christianity, cobbled together out of several independent traditions to make a whole.

There are at least two distinct strains of this in Muslim tradition.  One of these is related to the evolving ideology of expansionist military jihad.  In the late 700's and early 800's, Muslim scholars began dividing the world into an "Abode of Islam" and the "Abode of War," with a necessity for just Muslim rulers to always extend the former at the expense of the latter.  In this formulation, truces can only be temporary, and so Hudaybiyya came to be interpreted as a necessary tactical concession.  (In the late 20th century, of course, some Muslims concluded that there world had no just Muslim rulers, and so it was the duty of individual Muslims to wage military jihad everywhere, which is where we get al-Qaeda and ISIS.) 

Anyway, this is not the impression of Hudaybiyya conveyed in the 8th-century biographies of Ibn Ishaq and Ibn Rashid.  In both of these, Muhammad is actually portrayed as confident he could defeat the Meccans if necessary.  The impression I get, with background knowledge of 7th-century Arabia, is that the view they portray is one of "peace through strength."  In lawless Arabia, the strong preyed on the weak.  The Muslim community, having established itself as strong, was thus taking the road of agreeing to peace rather than take the more common Arabian route of subjugating their enemies.  In Guillaume's translation of Ibn Hisham's Ibn Ishaq recension, Muhammad even laments at 'Usfan: "Alas, Quraysh (the tribe of Mecca), war has devoured them!  What harm would they have suffered if they had left me and the rest of the Arabs to go our own ways?"

Labels: , ,

Wednesday, October 01, 2014

Urwa's Muhammad, Part I

In 2008, Andreas Gorke and Gregor Schoeler published a book summarizing their research into the accounts of the life of Muhammad attributed to Urwa b. al-Zubayr.  Since then, the debate over their findings and methods has continued.  One thing I like about their work, though, is that none of what they conclude is authentic material involves the miraculous.  (If I understand them correctly, lots of miraculous doings and embellishments were added to Urwa's accounts by Abu al-Aswad, one of those who passed them on.  Other embellishments were made by al-Zuhri, who served at the Umayyad court for over half a century.)  An account of a miracle would not invalidate it, since plenty of people believe they have experienced them, but to this post-Enlightenment historian the fact that there aren't any is striking.  To take the biggest example, Urwa does not have an account of Muhammad ascending to heaven on a winged horse to lead other prophets in prayer and speak with God.

Gorke and Schoeler's method leads them to believe that Urwa taught of seven major events in the life of Muhammad.  There is additional Urwa material, but given their methods very short traditions or those without a lot of later attestations are harder to work with, and they did not undertake it for this book.  It is, of course, also possible that longer traditions Urwa originally passed on have been lost.  In other words, rather than "This is what Urwa said," we should probably say, "Urwa said all of this, and probably some other stuff we can't be certain about."  The seven major events also represent key developments in standard accounts of Muhammad's life found in the later biographies.  For this reason, I occasionally draw upon those standard accounts for connective tissue.

1.) First Revelation - Urwa's account, according to the authors: While meditating on a nearby mountain, Muhammad had a vision and heard a voice commanding him to recite what was the first Quranic revelation, the first five verses of sura 96.  Muhammad's reaction was fear and despair that he was mad, and confided only in his wife Khadija.  Khadija then had Muhammad consult with her cousin Waraqa, who was educated, had become a Christian, and studied the Bible.  Waraqa tells him that he has had a divine revelation similar to that of Moses.

Muslim tradition identifies the Archangel Gabriel as the agent of revelation, but the authors conclude this was added later.  I suspect Waraqa was thinking of the Burning Bush Moses encountered on Mt. Sinai.  According to the traditional Muslim accounts, early 7th-century western Arabia had lots of people who were aware of the major religions of the Middle East, were not convinced of any of them, and yet filled with spiritual longing for the God of whom they spoke in different ways.  These people, called hanifs, meditated on mountains in the hopes of gaining wisdom.

2.) Flight to Medina - The authors conclude with certainty that Urwa taught that as more and more people converted to Islam, the Meccans turned against them with increasingly intense persecution, and that some began seeking asylum in Ethiopia with the Christians.  Thereafter the situation for Meccan Muslims briefly improved, but only briefly, and other Muslims began going to Medina.  Abu Bakr wanted to emigrate, but Muhammad asked him to remain.  Muhammad then went to Abu Bakr's dwelling every day, but on the day of the flight went at a different time, cluing Abu Bakr in that something was up.  Muhammad was worried that lots of people might be around, but Abu Bakr told him it only his family was there.  Muhammad then revealed his plans for emigration, and when Abu Bakr asked if he could, as well, was told he could.  Abu Bakr ordered two camels, which Muhammad insisted on paying for.  Leaving Mecca, the two men spent several days in a cave, where Abu Bakr's son brought them news from Mecca.  Finally, they found a trustworthy pagan guide to help them reach Medina, where they initially stayed among the B. Amr b. Awf tribe.  Amir b. Fuhayra, a shepherd who worked for Abu Bakr, showed them the cave and then went with them to Medina.

Nothing is here said of the arc of Muhammad's early career, but standard Muslim tradition is that he kept his revelations mostly to himself and a few close confidants for several years before a revelation ordering him to preach to all the Meccans.  Abu Bakr, a wealthy man in Mecca, would become the first caliph.  Nothing is here about a role for Ali, whom Shi'ites believe should have been Muhammad's successor.  Again, in the more developed biographies, the Quraysh had decided to kill Muhammad, by coincidence on the night he departed, and Ali slept in his bed so they would not realize he was gone.  Urwa's letter to Abd al-Malik is the only source in his corpus for the standard explanation of why he chose Medina to flee to:  that people there had heard of his wisdom, some had begun converting to Islam, and that all were willing to extend a covenant of protection if he came there.

3.) Battle of Badr - I can't find where the authors lay out precisely what they think is definitely authentic Urwa material about this event, which the developed biographies place a couple of years after the flight to Medina.  The most important account is Urwa's letter to the Umayyad Abd al-Malik; the letter indicate Abd al-Malik was seeking information about Abu Sufyan, the then-pagan leader of the Umayyad clan in Mecca who played a role.  According to Urwa's reply, Muslims and Meccans were in conflict, and the former raided the latter's flocks and merchant caravans.  Abu Sufyan was leading a merchant caravan back from Syria, which the Muslims intended to raid.  Most of the letter recounts manuvering around and intelligence gathering.  The Meccans expected a raid, and so sent out a force of about 1000 to defend the caravan.  The 300 or so Muslims found themselves in a pitched battle, which they won, though there were casualties on both sides.

Unfortunately, I can't find much at all in this chapter about why there was a conflict between Muslims and the Meccans.  There are accounts that Muhammad went to Medina with the intention of fighting Mecca from the beginning.  More common, and far better known among Muslims, is the tradition that this resolution came afterward, and that a Quranic revelation authorized it.  A commonly cited reason is that the Meccans had seized the properties of those Muslims who left the city, and so the Muslims felt entitled to take wealth back from the Meccans.  This sort of raiding was common in Arabia; think about cattle rustling and train robberies in American Westerns.  Things only became really intense when people started getting killed, as happened here.  Perhaps that is why, in a short but well-attested tradition, Urwa is mentioned as saying that Badr was the first battle against the Meccans, which is how it is remembered today while the raids are little-known.

This post is getting long, so I will deal with the other four events definitely handled by Urwa tomorrow.

Labels: , ,